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Key Points
 → Most of the regulatory measures to control 
excessive risk taking by systemically important 
firms are designed to reduce moral hazard and 
to align the interests of managers and investors. 
These measures may be flawed because they 
are based on questionable assumptions. 
 → Excessive corporate risk taking is, at its core, 
a corporate governance problem. Shareholder 
primacy requires managers to view the 
consequences of their firm’s risk taking 
only from the standpoint of the firm and its 
shareholders, ignoring harm to the public. In 
governing, managers of systemically important 
firms should also consider public harm.
 → This proposal engages the long-standing 
debate whether corporate governance law 
should require some duty to the public. The 
accepted wisdom is that corporate profit 
maximization provides jobs and other benefits 
that exceed public harm. The debate requires 
rethinking for systemic economic harm. 
 → This policy brief rethinks that debate, 
demonstrating that a corporate governance 
duty can be designed to control systemic risk 
without unduly weakening wealth production. 
Excessive1 corporate risk taking by systemically 
important financial firms is widely seen as one 
of the primary causes of the 2007-2008 global 
financial crisis. In response, governments have 
issued or are considering an array of regulatory 
measures to attempt to curb that risk taking 
and prevent another crisis. This policy brief 
argues that these measures are inadequate, 
and that controlling excessive risk taking also 
requires regulation of corporate governance. 
Excessive Risk Taking 
and Systemic Harm
Existing Regulatory Measures 
to Control Excessive Risk 
Taking Are Flawed
The regulatory measures to control excessive risk 
taking by systemically important firms tend to 
fall into two broad categories. Some are designed 
to end the problem of “too big to fail,” assuming 
that firms engage in excessive risk taking 
because they would profit by a success and be 
1	 This	policy	brief	is	based	in	part	on	the	author’s	article:	“Misalignment:	
Corporate	Risk-Taking	and	Public	Duty”	(2016)	92:1	Notre	Dame	
L	Rev	1	[Schwarcz,	“Misalignment”],	online:	<http://ssrn.com/
abstract=2644375>.
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bailed out by the government in case of a failure.2 
Other measures are designed to control excessive 
risk taking by aligning managerial and investor 
interests, assuming that the investors themselves 
would oppose excessively risky business ventures.3 
These measures may be flawed, however, because 
they are based on questionable assumptions. The 
assumption that systemically important firms 
engage in morally hazardous risk taking because 
they expect a bailout has no real empirical support. 
Some empirical studies conflate correlation and 
causation, assuming that if many systemically 
important firms engage in risky behaviour, that 
behaviour was predicated on bailout expectations.4 
Other empirical studies merely show that 
systemically important firms can borrow at lower 
cost, which does not say anything about whether 
those firms in fact engage in morally hazardous risk 
taking because there are many other reasons why 
systemically important firms, which generally are 
large, can borrow at lower cost than smaller firms.5 
That assumption may also be contrary to 
management incentives. Managers who cause 
their firms to engage in excessive risk taking 
in the expectation of a government bailout are 
taking serious personal risks. If, as in the case of 
Lehman Brothers, the government fails to bail 
out the firm, those managers are almost certain 
to lose their jobs. Even if a bailout occurs, it 
may well be conditioned on those managers 
resigning or otherwise giving recompense.6 In 
either case, the ensuing reputational damage may 
permanently end a manager’s financial career.7 
2 This is primarily a problem of moral hazard, that persons protected from 
the negative consequences of their risky actions will be tempted to take 
more	risks.	
3	 These	include,	for	example,	requiring	a	systemically	important	firm	to	
tie	management	compensation	to	the	firm’s	long-term	performance,	or	
requiring	a	systemically	important	firm	to	maintain	so-called	contingent	
capital,	in	which	debt	securities	convert	into	equity	upon	specified	
conditions.
4	 See	e.g.	Dam	Lammertjan	&	Michael	Koetter,	“Bank	Bailouts	and	Moral	
Hazard:	Evidence	from	Germany”	(2012)	25	Rev	Fin	Studs	2343	at	
2344.
5	 See	e.g.	Steven	L	Schwarcz,	“Too	Big	to	Fool:	Moral	Hazard,	Bailouts,	
and Corporate Responsibility”, 102 Minn L Rev [forthcoming in 2017-
2018],	online:	<http://ssrn.com/abstract=2847026>.
6	 See	e.g. Jeffrey	Friedman	&	Wladimir	Kraus,	Engineering the Financial 
Crisis: Systemic Risk and the Failure of Regulation	(Philadelphia,	PA:	
University	of	Pennsylvania	Press,	2011)	at	43.
7 Ibid.		
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The assumption that a systemically important 
firm’s investors would oppose excessively risky 
business ventures is also questionable. What 
constitutes “excessive” risk taking depends on 
the observer: risk taking is excessive from a given 
observer’s standpoint if it has a negative expected 
value to that observer — i.e., the expected costs 
to that observer exceed the expected benefits. It is 
reasonable to assume that investors would oppose 
risky business ventures with a negative expected 
value to them. But because much of the systemic 
harm from their failure would be externalized onto 
the public (including ordinary citizens impacted 
by an economic collapse), systemically important 
firms can engage in risk-taking ventures that 
have a positive expected value to their investors 
but a negative expected value to the public.8 
Regulators and policy makers are beginning to 
recognize that the existing regulatory measures 
are inadequate. Reporting on a widely attended 
meeting at the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston 
late last year, The New York Times observed that 
“policy makers have made little progress in 
figuring out how they might actually” prevent 
another financial crisis.9 Donald Kohn, former 
vice chair of the Federal Reserve Board, said 
that the Fed “doesn’t really have the tools” to 
prevent another crisis. Luc Laeven, the European 
Central Bank’s director general for research, 
summarized the consensus of the conference: 
“Both monetary policy and macroprudential 
[regulatory] policy are not really very effective.” 
He then asked, “Do we have other policies?”10 
Excessive Risk Taking is a 
Corporate	Governance	Problem
We may well have other policies. Excessive 
corporate risk taking results from managerial 
decisions. At its core, therefore, it is a corporate 
governance problem. The shareholder-primacy 
framework for governance, followed throughout 
the world, requires corporate managers to view 
the consequences of their firm’s actions only from 
the standpoint of the firm and its shareholders. 
That perspective ignores externalities, including 
harm to the public caused by the firm’s risk 
8	 Schwarcz,	“Misalignment”,	supra	note	1.
9	 See	Binyamin	Appelbaum,	“Skepticism	Prevails	on	Preventing	Crisis”,	The 
New York Times	(5	October	2015)	B1.
10 Ibid.	
taking.11 The most direct way of controlling 
that risk taking would be to regulate corporate 
governance, to require managers to also consider 
the public consequences of their firm’s actions. 
Proposing such a requirement engages the 
longstanding debate whether corporate governance 
law should require some duty to the public. The 
accepted wisdom is not to require such a duty — 
that corporate profit maximization provides jobs 
and other public benefits that exceed any harm. 
This is especially true, the argument goes, because 
imposing specific regulatory requirements and 
making certain actions illegal or tortious — what 
this policy brief will call “regulating substance,” in 
contrast to “regulating governance” — can mitigate 
the harm without unduly impairing corporate 
wealth production. Opponents of a public duty 
also argue that managers could not feasibly govern 
if they had to take into account the myriad small 
externalities that result from corporate risk taking.
Whether or not these arguments are sensible in 
the traditional corporate context, they lose their 
force in the face of systemic economic harm. 
Systemic externalities are significant, including 
the devastating harm caused by an economic 
collapse. Regulating substance has so far proved 
inadequate to control those externalities. 
Regulating governance also has an intrinsic 
advantage over regulating substance in controlling 
systemic externalities. Regulating substance often 
depends on regulators precisely understanding 
the financial “architecture” — the particular 
design and structure of financial firms, markets 
and other related institutions — at the time the 
regulation is promulgated.12 Because the financial 
architecture is constantly changing, that type 
of grounded regulation has value as long as it is 
updated as needed to adapt to those changes. 
But ongoing financial monitoring and regulatory 
updating can be costly and is subject to political 
interference at each updating stage. As a result, 
financial regulation of substance usually lags 
behind financial innovation, causing unanticipated 
consequences and allowing innovations to escape 
11	 Schwarcz,	“Misalignment”,	supra	note	1.	
12	 See	Steven	L	Schwarcz,	“Regulating	Financial	Change:	A	Functional	
Approach”	(2016)	100	Minn	L	Rev	1441.
4 Policy	Brief	No.	99	—	February	2017			•			Steven	L.	Schwarcz
regulatory scrutiny.13 Regulating governance, 
in contrast, can overcome that regulatory 
time lag. To fulfill their governance duties, the 
managers of a firm that is proposing to engage 
in a financially innovative but risky project 
must try to obtain the most current information 
about the innovation and its consequences. 
Regulating governance therefore could add 
value to regulating substance in controlling 
systemic externalities. Next, this policy 
brief considers how corporate governance 
regulation could be redesigned to accomplish 
that without impairing profit maximization. 
Redesigning Corporate 
Governance	Regulation
In making corporate risk-taking decisions, the 
duty that managers currently have toward 
systemically important firms and their investors 
should be expanded to the public, to reduce 
systemic externalities. So long as it does not 
unduly weaken wealth-producing capacity 
(corporate wealth production being in the public 
interest), such a public governance duty would 
help to align private and public interests. 
The analysis next considers first the 
theory, and then the practicality, of 
implementing a public governance duty.
Reconciling	a	Public	Governance	Duty	
with	Corporate	Governance	Theory
There are three theoretical models of corporate 
governance: a stakeholder model, a contractarian 
model and a shareholder-primacy model. As 
explained below, a public governance duty would 
not be inconsistent with these models except to the 
extent it intentionally limits shareholder primacy. 
13 See ibid (observing that this occurred in 2008, for example, when the 
pre-crisis	financial	regulatory	framework,	which	assumed	the	dominance	
of bank-intermediated funding, failed to adequately address a collapsing 
financial	system	in	which	the	majority	of	funding	had	become	non-bank	
intermediated).
Stakeholder Model
A public governance duty would most clearly 
be consistent with the stakeholder model of 
governance, which considers the interests of 
everyone affected by a firm’s actions to avoid 
anyone being unfairly exploited. The public, of 
course, is affected by a firm’s risk taking. This 
model, however, adds little explanatory value 
because there is fundamental disagreement on 
the extent to which non-investor stakeholder 
interests should be taken into account, valued 
and balanced with shareholder interests. 
Contractarian Model
A public governance duty would, at first glance, 
appear to be inconsistent with the contractarian 
model of governance — that a firm is a “nexus 
of contracts” among private parties. After all, 
members of the public are not contracting 
parties. Contract law, however, does not limit its 
application to contracting parties. Government 
should be able to limit freedom of contracting 
when the contracting causes externalities. 
The critical question is which externalities 
should count in limiting that freedom. 
Even under contract law, there is no absolute 
answer to that question. But we need to answer 
only a much more limited question: Should 
systemic externalities count in limiting freedom 
of contract? That question has already effectively 
been answered: systemic externalities not 
only harm the public, who cannot contract to 
protect themselves, but also cause much more 
harm than non-systemic externalities, including 
widespread poverty and unemployment. 
These are exactly the types of externalities that 
should count in limiting freedom of contract. 
Shareholder-primacy Model
A public governance duty would technically 
be inconsistent with the shareholder-primacy 
model. Proponents of shareholder primacy 
argue that managers of for-profit corporations 
should govern the firm solely for the best 
interests of its shareholders. They accept that 
firms can cause externalities, but they believe 
the efficient response is for government to 
regulate substance, without interfering with 
corporate governance. However, where regulating 
substance is insufficient, as in the case of 
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controlling the excessive corporate risk taking 
that causes systemic externalities, the alternative 
should be to regulate corporate governance.    
Next consider a public governance 
duty’s practicalities: how to regulate 
governance without unduly weakening 
corporate wealth-producing capacity.
Practicalities of a Public 
Governance	Duty
Under a public governance duty, the managers 
of a systemically important firm would not 
only have a private corporate governance 
duty to the firm and its investors but also a 
duty not to engage in excessive risk taking 
that could systemically harm the public.14 That 
public duty raises several practical issues. 
Legally Imposing the Duty
How should a public governance duty be legally 
imposed? Courts, for example, could create such 
a duty through judicial decisions. Or legislatures 
could amend their corporation laws to require 
such a duty. The latter may be preferred because 
imposing such a duty broadly impacts public policy. 
In the United States, for example, this would mean 
that a public governance duty should be imposed 
either by state legislatures (especially the Delaware 
legislature, because most domestic firms are 
incorporated under Delaware law) or by the US 
Congress. Because corporation law in the United 
States is traditionally state, not federal, states 
ideally should take the lead in imposing such a duty. 
It is questionable, however, whether state 
legislatures are well positioned to impose a public 
governance duty. Any given legislature would be 
unlikely to want to pioneer such a duty because 
it could discourage firms from incorporating in 
its state. Furthermore, systemic risk is a national 
14 Cf	John	Carney,	“Big-Bank	Board	Game	Puts	Shareholders	in	Second	
Place”, The Wall Street Journal (5 April 2015) (noting a speech by US 
Federal	Reserve	Governor	Daniel	Tarullo	suggesting	that	“corporate	
governance	would	need	to	change	to	broaden	the	scope	of	boards’	
fiduciary	duties	to	reflect	macroprudential	[i.e.,	systemic]	regulatory	
objectives”).	The	nation	of	Iceland	has	actually	enacted	legislation	
that appears to require, at least in principle, the managers of certain 
systemically	important	firms	to	“operate[]	[their	firms]	in	the	interests	
of	.	.	.	shareholders	.	.	.	and	the	entire	national	economy.”	Ministry	of	
Industries	and	Innovation,	Act	No	161/2002	on	Financial	Undertakings.
and international problem, not usually a local 
state problem. The “internalization principle” 
recognizes that regulatory responsibilities 
should generally be assigned to the unit of 
government that best internalizes the full 
costs of the underlying regulated activity. For 
these reasons, Congress may be best situated 
to impose a public governance duty. 
Assessing	and	Balancing	Costs	and	Benefits
How should managers of a systemically important 
firm, or members of such a firm’s risk committee,15 
assess and balance the public costs and private 
benefits of a risk-taking activity? Consider two 
approaches, one subjective and the other more 
objective and ministerial. On a case-by-case 
basis, managers could choose which approach 
to follow. Either approach should be needed 
only when deciding on a risky project whose 
failure might, either itself or in combination 
with other factors of which such managers are 
or should be aware,16 cause the firm to fail.17
Managers following a subjective approach would 
simply consider those costs and balance them 
against benefits — the same way they would 
consider and balance any other relevant costs 
and benefits when making a corporate risk-taking 
decision. Their assessment and balancing might, but 
would not necessarily, be documented or explained. 
Managers may favour this approach because it 
would not change their current behaviour. 
This subjective approach would have at least 
three drawbacks, however. First, because the 
consequences of a systemic collapse can be 
devastating to the public, the decision-making 
process to mitigate that harm should be more 
transparent. Second, managers following a 
subjective approach may be subject to peer 
pressure to favour investor profitability over 
avoiding public harm — especially when, as later 
15 Surprisingly, even risk committees required by the Dodd-Frank Act in the 
United States are not obligated, and indeed may have no legal authority, 
to	consider	risks	to	the	public.
16 Cf	John	Armour	&	Jeffrey	N	Gordon,	“Systemic	Harms	and	Shareholder	
Value”	(2014)	6	J	Leg	Analysis	35	(observing	that	“it	is	surely	the	board’s	
responsibility to identify those risks which are of a magnitude and kind as 
to	threaten	the	firm’s	stability”	at	69).
17 Cf supra note 8 and accompanying text (observing that systemic 
externalities can result from risk taking that causes the failure of a 
systemically	important	firm).	
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observed, managers often have conflicts of interest 
that favour the firm’s shareholders over the public. 
Third, although courts generally try to avoid 
second-guessing management decisions, even 
managers should want to follow an approach that 
provides an explicit safe harbour against litigation 
— at least if the approach is relatively ministerial.   
Consider how to craft a possible ministerial 
safe-harbour objective approach, using the 
generic example of a systemically important 
firm engaging in a risky project that could be 
profitable. The expected private benefits would 
be the expected value of the project to the 
firm’s investors (usually the shareholders). The 
expected public costs would be the expected 
value of the project’s systemic costs.18   
In large part, the firm’s managers should have 
sufficient information, or at least much more 
information than third parties, about these values. 
For example, managers should have much more 
information than third parties about valuing 
the chance of the project being successful, the 
value to investors from that success, the loss 
from the project’s failure, and the chance of the 
firm failing as a result of the project’s failure.  
The exception, however, is valuing the systemic 
costs if the firm fails. That valuation should be a 
public policy choice. It might be based, for example, 
on the estimated cost of a government bailout to 
avoid a systemic failure. Such an estimate could be 
made by the government as part of the process of 
designating a firm as “systemically important,” and 
thereafter periodically updated by the government.
From a strict (Kaldor-Hicks) economic efficiency 
standpoint, the project would be efficient if its 
expected value to investors exceeds the expected 
value of its systemic costs. As a public policy 
matter, however, simple economic efficiency 
may be insufficient because the magnitude 
and harmful consequences of a systemic 
collapse, if it occurs, could be devastating. 
When balancing the costs and benefits of activities 
that might pose great harm, policy makers 
normally apply a precautionary principle directing 
regulators to err on the side of safety. Applying 
that to this policy brief ’s balancing, it may be 
18	 The	“Misalignment”	article	on	which	this	policy	brief	is	partly	based	
examines	in	detail	how	these	costs	and	benefits	could	be	calculated.	See	
Schwarcz,	“Misalignment”,	supra	note	1.
appropriate (as Cass Sunstein has proposed in 
another context19) to require “a margin of safety” 
— for example, requiring that the expected value 
to investors considerably exceeds the expected 
value of systemic costs — to demonstrate 
that a given risk-taking activity is justified.   
Enforcing	a	Public	Governance	Duty
Who should enforce a public governance duty? 
Under existing corporate governance law, 
shareholder derivative suits are the primary 
enforcement mechanism. Shareholders would 
have no interest, however, in suing managers 
of their firm for externalizing systemic harm. 
Therefore, the government, by default, at least 
should have the right to enforce the public duty.
The government itself may be unable to effectively 
monitor a firm’s internal compliance with the 
public governance duty until the firm fails, when 
systemic consequences may be irremediable. 
To facilitate better monitoring, regulation 
implementing a public governance duty should 
include whistleblower incentives, including 
anti-retaliation protection for managers or others 
involved in the risk assessment who inform 
government officials of their firm’s non-compliance 
and possibly also monetary rewards. Regulation 
implementing a public governance duty might 
even impose an obligation on managers involved 
in the risk assessment to inform government 
officials of their firm’s non-compliance.  
Another way to facilitate better monitoring, 
and more specifically enforcement, of the 
public governance duty would be to incentivize 
members of the public themselves. In the 
United States, for example, there is precedent 
for so-called qui tam suits, under which private 
citizens can sue alleged defrauders in the name 
of the government. If the suit is successful 
or settled, the citizen-plaintiff is entitled to a 
percentage of the award or settlement.20 
19	 See	Cass	R	Sunstein,	“Beyond the Precautionary Principle” (2003) 151 
U Pa L Rev 1003 (discussing a form of the precautionary principle under 
which	“regulation	should	include	a	margin	of	safety”	at	1014).
20	 See	Schwarcz,	“Misalignment”,	supra	note	1.
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Business Judgment Rule as a Defence
A critical issue concerns the business judgment rule 
as a defence to manager liability. In the traditional 
corporate governance context, managerial risk-
taking decisions are protected to some extent 
by this rule, which presumes that managers 
should not be personally liable for harm caused 
by negligent decisions made in good faith and 
without conflicts of interest — and in some 
articulations of the business judgment rule, also 
without gross negligence. The rule attempts to 
balance the goal of protecting investors from 
losses against the goals of encouraging the best 
managers to serve and avoiding the exercise of 
inappropriate judicial discretion (as would occur if 
courts tried to second-guess business judgments). 
The business judgment rule arguably should apply 
differently in a public-governance-duty context 
because one of the rule’s basic assumptions — 
that there be no conflict of interest — may be 
breached. The interest of a manager who holds 
significant shares or interests in shares, or whose 
compensation or retention is dependent on share 
price, is aligned with the firm’s shareholders, 
not with that of the public. To that extent, the 
manager would have a conflict of interest.  
But how should the business judgment rule be 
modified without requiring courts to exercise 
inappropriate discretion or discouraging the best 
people from serving as managers? One approach 
would be to prevent conflicted managers who 
are grossly negligent — that is, who fail to use 
even slight care in assessing systemic harm to 
the public — from using the rule as a defence. 
Technically, this modification merely applies the 
gross negligence standard that is often articulated 
as part of the business judgment rule, although 
rarely utilized with any rigour. Because courts 
routinely review whether other types of actions 
are grossly negligent, they should not find it 
inappropriate or impractical to review corporate 
risk-taking actions under a gross negligence 
standard. As a practical matter, managers who 
follow a reasonable procedure to balance public 
costs and private benefits should be protected. That 
would effectively conform the business judgment 
rule’s public-governance-duty application to a duty 
of process care, a standard commonly used.21  
To	What	Extent	Should	Managers	Be	Protected	
under	Directors	and	Officers	Liability	Insurance?
Another issue is the extent to which managers 
who become subject to liability for breaching 
the public governance duty should be protected 
under directors and officers (D&O) liability 
insurance, which indemnifies managers against 
personal liability. Although D&O liability insurance 
is needed to incentivize good managers and 
also to help ensure that sufficient funds are 
available to properly incentivize private-action 
lawsuits, it might compromise the deterrent 
effect of imposing personal liability. Furthermore, 
because the magnitude of systemic harm is 
open ended, insurers may be reluctant to offer 
D&O insurance covering breaches of the public 
governance duty. At least one possible solution 
to these concerns would be to specify a limit on 
the amount of the claim that could be imposed 
for breaching the public governance duty and, 
like a deductible, to require managers to be 
personally liable for some portion of that amount. 
Conclusions
Since the financial crisis, regulators have been 
trying to prevent systemically important firms 
from engaging in excessive risk taking, which 
is widely seen as one of the primary causes 
of the crisis. Regulatory measures to date 
21 The requirement that managers use at least slight care in assessing 
systemic harm to the public would also be consistent with the business 
judgment	rule’s	actual	application	in	at	least	some	jurisdictions	that	do	
not	formally	articulate	a	gross	negligence	standard	as	part	of	the	rule.	
Delaware,	for	example,	disallows	business-judgment-rule	protection	for	
managers	who	act	in	“bad	faith.”	See In re Walt Disney Co Derivative 
Litigation,	907	A	(2d)	693	(Del	Ch	2005)	(explaining	that	“[t]he	
presumption	of	the	business	judgment	rule	creates	a	presumption	that	
a	director	acted	in	good	faith”	and	that	“[t]he	good	faith	required	of	a	
corporate	fiduciary	includes	.	.	.	duties	of	care	and	loyalty”	at	755).	Bad	
faith	is	broadly	defined	as	including	conduct	that	“is	known to constitute 
a	violation	of	applicable	positive	law.”	Gagliardi v TriFoods Int’l, Inc, 
683	A	(2d)	1049	at	1051	n	2	(Del	Ch	1996)	[emphasis	in	original].	Such	
conduct	is	interpreted	to	include	a	manager	failing	to	take	“steps	in	a	
good	faith	effort	to	prevent	or	remedy”	such	a	violation.	In re Caremark 
Int’l Inc Derivative Litigation,	698	A	(2d)	959	at	971	(Del	Ch	1996).	A	
manager’s	failure	to	use	even	slight	care	when	assessing	systemic	harm	
to the public under a legally mandated public governance duty would 
appear	to	be	bad	faith	under	those	interpretations.
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are mostly designed to reduce moral hazard 
from such firms being too big to fail (and thus 
profiting from successful risk taking, but being 
bailed out by public money in case of a failure) 
or to align managerial and investor interests 
(assuming investors would oppose managers 
engaging their firm in excessive risk taking).
These regulatory measures are based on 
questionable assumptions. The assumption that 
systemically important firms engage in morally 
hazardous risk taking because they expect a 
bailout has no real empirical support and may 
be contrary to management incentives. The 
assumption that aligning managerial and investor 
interests would deter excessive risk taking is also 
questionable because what constitutes excessive 
risk taking depends on the observer. Although 
investors would oppose risk taking that has a 
negative expected value to them, systemically 
important firms can take business risks that 
have a positive expected value to their investors 
but a negative expected value to the public 
because much of the systemic harm from their 
failure would be externalized onto the public. 
It therefore should not be surprising that regulators 
concede that existing regulatory measures are still 
inadequate to prevent another financial crisis.22 
This policy brief argues that regulating corporate 
governance could help to prevent systemically 
important firms from engaging in excessive risk 
taking. Managers of those firms should have a 
duty not only to the firm and its investors but also 
to society (a public governance duty). The policy 
brief explains how to design such a duty that does 
not unduly weaken wealth-producing capacity,23 
thereby better aligning private and public interests. 
Because this policy brief errs on the side of 
protecting corporate wealth production, the 
proposed public governance duty may not 
completely prevent the excessive risk taking that 
causes systemic externalities. Even if imperfect, 
however, that duty should constitute an important 
22 See Appelbaum, supra note	8	and	accompanying	text.
23	 The	“Misalignment”	article	on	which	this	policy	brief	is	partly	based	
proposes	possible	language	for	a	Public	Governance	Duty	Act	
incorporating	such	a	duty.	See	Schwarcz,	“Misalignment”, supra	note	1.
first step24 toward shaping corporate governance 
norms to begin to take the public into account.25
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